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Anthropology through Levinas
Knowing the Uniqueness of Ego and the Mystery of Otherness
by Nigel Rapport
An anthropological commonplace since Evans-Pritchard has been that ethnographic subjects will have their ra-
tionality circumscribed by the discursive opportunities made available by a “culture.” Hence, social science comes
to terms with the “internal” nature of judgements (Winch). Ultimately, the relativist nature of both Winch’s and
Evans-Pritchard’s conclusion has its source in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. For Wittgenstein, “the limits of my
language mean the limits of my world.” Moreover, “language” in this connection extends to the “textual” nature of
behavior per se. There exists a determining habituation of embodiment and dwelling as well as of reasoning, be-
lieving, and talking. This article explores the nature of a pretextual or nontextual sphere that exists beyond con-
ventional—“cultural”—languages. Wittgensteinian assumptions are set against those of Max Stirner and Emmanuel
Levinas. While in many ways disparate, the writings of Stirner on the ego and of Levinas on the “other” both insist
that knowledge can be derived—knowledge, indeed, of a fundamental, even absolute, nature—by way of a tran-
scending of a taken-for-granted symbolic, conceptual, textual, and doctrinal language-world. What is key is the
attention one pays to corporeality: to the “ﬂesh and mind” of the self (Stirner), to the “body and face” of the other
(Levinas). The article is theoretical and epistemological in register. An ethnographic afterword points in the di-
rection of how the argument might be grounded in representations of ﬁeldwork encounters.
Through my small, bonebound island I have learnt all I
know, experienced all, and sensed all.
—(Dylan Thomas, letter to Pamela Hansford John-
son, November 1933 [1966:48])
It has been a commonplace in anthropology since Evans-
Pritchard that one anticipates ethnographic subjects—in-
cluding anthropologists themselves—as having their ratio-
nality circumscribed by, indeed deﬁned by, the discursive
opportunities made available to them by a “culture.” The
latter entailed a moral system, not a natural system. Hence,
belief in witchcraft may be “rational” according to the cos-
mological worldview within which observation, explanation,
reaction, and social interaction must symbolically function
(Evans-Pritchard 1937). The “idea of a social science” is to
come to terms with the “internal” nature of judgments, as
Peter Winch (1970:107) famously phrased it, internal to the
subjects’ discursive possibilities. Ultimately, the relativist na-
ture of both Winch’s and Evans-Pritchard’s conclusion—that
one cannot reason outside, or against, a system of beliefs,
because one has no other idiom in which to express one’s
thoughts—has its source inWittgenstein’s “ordinary-language
philosophy.” In Wittgenstein’s own words, “the limits of my
language mean the limits of my world” (1922:5.6). Language
is instrumental in determining a life-world, or “form of life,”
and the latter must be accepted as a given; so that “what we
cannot talk about we must pass over in silence” (Wittgen-
stein 1922:7). Moreover, “language” in this connection can
be understood as extending to behavior as such, given the
“textual” or patterned nature of the latter. To say that one is
immersed in a form of life is tantamount to saying that there
exists a determining habituation of one’s embodiment and
environmental dwelling as well as of one’s reasoning, be-
lieving, and talking. One dwells within an environing, and
limiting, habitus as well as within a language-game. All is
determinately textualized.
This article explores the nature of a possible pretextual
or nontextual sphere, however, that exists beyond ordinary
or conventional—“cultural”—language, that human beings
nevertheless inhabit and, moreover, from which they have
the capacity to extract rational knowledge. The “pretextual”
invites us beyond the domain of conventional conceptuali-
zation and classiﬁcation, beyond the commonsensical and
habitual, to a place from which we begin to know, again, as
human beings.
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each and every individual. While language has its essential
social and cultural properties, we afﬁrm that in both speak-
ing and writing people retain the capacity to communicate
unique experiences in unique ways. At the same time, ac-
knowledging our biological affordance to language has not
prevented the emergence of stridently relativist arguments,
such as those of Wittgenstein. So rather than a dualist oppo-
sition, perhaps it is better to regard the claim to the uniqueness
and individuality of each person as the end of a spectrum that
also includes the claim to the uniqueness and speciﬁcity of
culture.
Over many works Rapport has sought to rescue the ap-
preciation of individuals against their suppression in an-
thropological generalization. Again, I would support Rapport
in this, and I ﬁnd that, in my own writing as in his, it is im-
portant to have the kind of stories he ends with to make that
point. But I would suggest this should be a question of bal-
ance, not a simple opposition. So my criticism is that Rapport
takes this to an extreme, and the reason for this in this pa-
per is that he is not here writing balanced ethnography but
turning to philosophy. Just because Levinas is a renowned
philosopher, his claims that the relationship to the other is
absolute and his discussion of the irreducible nature of the
face of the other are not in themselves evidence for such
claims. Indeed, these citations make clear that Levinas is
largely concerned with the particular responsibility of phi-
losophy as a discipline and his own theological concerns. It
does not create an anthropological argument that when we
pursue pre- or supratextual knowledge we thereby encounter
a human corporality that is unique and a mystery.
This exempliﬁes the problem of anthropology’s relation-
ship to philosophy, which has become asymmetrical and
detrimental to the discipline. Increasingly, anthropologists
look to philosophy to resolve issues we ﬁnd difﬁcult, too ﬂuid,
and too disparate. Philosophy can certainly achieve the am-
bitions we have for it, because it provides levels of abstrac-
tion where things can be resolved in semantics and logic.
Anthropology is better served by resisting this allure of phi-
losophy and refusing to privilege any dimension of its en-
counter, be it language, cognition, or ego. Instead, it should
retain its grounding in comparative ethnography and argue
on the basis of what we ﬁnd and can ourselves attest to. It may
be harder, but I would suggest that it is always better to be
unresolved anthropologists than resolved philosophers.
So I blame philosophy for leading Rapport from a useful
critique to a concluding section where he argues that either
we accept a social analysis where culture is homogenizing or
determinant or we accept these philosophers’ privileging of
the unique individual. It is philosophy that requires this kind
of precision and distinction. At least since Bourdieu, most
anthropologists have accepted that culture, in the sense of the
normative, is neither deterministic nor a rule. Many actual
instances will fail to accord with cultural claims. We can re-
spect individuals without mystifying their integrity. We will
always have to work in worlds that make many generalized
claims and yet always though particular instances. For these
reasons, anthropology is much better served by its commit-
ment to demystiﬁcation than standing in awe of any mystery
of ego, or irreducibility of ontology for that matter. Let’s leave
that to the philosophers.
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In this thought-provoking piece, Nigel Rapport argues that
human beings have the intuitive perceptual capacity to rec-
ognize a commensurateness in fellow humans that goes be-
yond the sociocultural and historical contingencies of time
and place. The title is slightly misleading because the article
draws on the philosophical thinking of both Emmanuel Le-
vinas and the lesser-known Max Stirner. Rapport confronts
us, once again, with an old tension within the discipline be-
tween the enlightened universalism of “anthropos” and the
romantic diversitarianism of “ethnos” (Stocking 1992). His-
torically, the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states
and the era of imperial and colonial expansionism led to a
disproportionate stress on the study of “difference.” Main-
stream sociocultural anthropology became conﬂated with the
project of ethnography (Ingold 2008), namely, the systematic
study and description of individual human cultures.
Ironically, processes of (mostly cultural) globalization have
renewed the anthropological attention paid to human uni-
versals and universal humanity. This is most often couched
in the popular language of cosmopolitanism (Wardle 2010).
Rapport (2012a) himself has been promoting “cosmopolitan
anthropology,” which may be conceived of as a return to the
discipline’s Enlightenment origins (and an antidote to dom-
inant postmodern ideas). When Immanuel Kant ﬁrst for-
mulated anthropology as a modern project, a science of hu-
mankind, what he had in mind was precisely the linking up
of the individual human being, in its everyday diversity, and
its more global historical commonality.
Inspired by Stirner and Levinas, Rapport advocates for “a
duty of distance and of ignorance concerning the substance
of other individual human lives.” Anthropological knowing,
he argues, comprises “the progressive understanding of a
universal human condition” (a “scientiﬁc discernment of hu-
man capacities”). This point of view relates to a strand in
anthropological epistemology that stresses the importance of
“strangeness” in the ethnographic encounter and the fact
that there always remains a (necessary) distance between the
self and the other (Agar 1996). This leaves room for mystery
and wonder, for passion and anarchy, in brief, for an aes-
thetic appreciation of the human other (Autrui) that exceeds
the comprehension of the ego and exists independently of
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any relation to that ego. While the anthropologist in the ﬁeld
may get close to grasping human complexity, from the mo-
ment ethnography becomes writing he or she is caught in
(con)text and interpretation. What exactly gets lost in trans-
lating “pretextual, nonconventional, acultural knowing” to
“an emergent technical textualization”? Would nontextual
forms of data gathering and analysis serve us any better?
For Levinas, it is the “face,” the singularity of an impression
that is absolutely unique, that reveals absolute otherness in
the other person (Benson and O’Neill 2007). Rapport, too,
stresses the importance of “ego’s face-to-face relation with
the other.” However, in today’s world, many interactions be-
tween people no longer take place in a face-to-face context
that allows a direct, prerational engagement with others. What
does Rapport’s anthropology have to say about a humanity that
is increasingly mediating human interaction through “dis-
tancing” information and communication technologies? How
would he respond to the critique that his vision of anthropol-
ogy is overly subjectivist and anthropocentric? Is it not putting
too much stress on individuality and giving too much agency
to the individual? Should anthropology automatically exclude
that which lies beyond the human (however broad or narrow
the latter is deﬁned)?
All people on this planet may share a similar potential to
become “an autonomous, capable human actor,” but far from
everybody is able to realize that potential. Rapport’s stress on
corporeality—the “ﬂesh and mind” of the self (Stirner) and
the “body and face” of the other (Levinas)—leads to questions
regarding the “boundaries” of universal humanity. From
which point in a person’s life trajectory does the human organ
of perception that “enables ego to know alter” become func-
tional, and when does it stop working? The proposed philo-
sophical model is based on an ideal-type able-bodied and
able-minded human. In which ways can the organ of per-
ception malfunction, and what does this tell us about uni-
versal humanity? Moreover, if humans have “the perceptual
capability of recognizing universally a humanity that is dis-
tinct from thinghood and from animality and from tech-
nology,” how do they deal with instances where individual
corporeal boundaries are not all that clear (e.g., Siamese
twins)? Answering these queries related to abnormality may
help ﬁne-tune the model.
Finally, Rapport stresses that his contribution is theoret-
ical and epistemological. Indeed, the questions he addresses
are mainly philosophical ones. Anthropology ideally addresses
these issues “in the world,” but Rapport does not elaborate
much on the methodologies through which anthropologists
in particular can obtain access to the assumed commonality
that unites humans. Which methodological toolbox do we
have at our disposal? For many anthropologists, essays like
this one are most likely perceived as highly abstract and dif-
ﬁcult to apply outside the given conceptual frame. In sum,
Rapport’s provocative text probably raises more questions
than it answers.
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This essay, drawing centrally on Stirner and Levinas, nudges
us to rethink anthropology by paying a new type of atten-
tion to the self-conscious individual human being. The kind
of anthropology Rapport has in mind would reconnect us
with the liberal idealist thinkers of a previous era, who placed
free-acting individuality at the center of their (philosophical)
anthropologies. In particular, he goes back to Stirner (meth-
odological egoism), adapting Stirner’s concerns to those of a
more familiar contemporary philosophical voice, Levinas’s
(the mystery of the other), in order to highlight how mar-
ginalized the human self has become during the past decades
of anthropological thought.
Suddenly, as it were, Rapport reveals to us that contem-
porary social inquiry shows little, if any, interest in actual
selves, since the primary engagement is still with modeled
subjectivities and these only for what they demonstrate
about a larger cultural ﬁeld, of which individuals are con-
sidered to be a fold. I strongly agree with the need Rapport
is describing—the need to put the speciﬁcity (including the
vagary, the inconsequence) of individual life back into the
center of anthropological thinking and likewise the need
to reassert philosophical anthropology as a counterpoint to
structural or other modes of cultural-contextual accounting
for human experience.
It is worth drawing on another nineteenth-century thinker
here—Thomas Hill Green—to foreground key points. Green’s
liberal idealism was posited against the social evolutionism
of his day that would reduce individuality to an arbitrary ex-
pression of social-environmental forces. For Green (as for Rap-
port), the human individual is a spontaneous, self-realizing
being whose self-consciousness freely and actively introduces
newness into its relationship with the world. The individual
is certainly, however, also a mystery both to others and to
itself. The self remains a mystery to itself because it can
know what it is only by remaking its personality in the world
out of circumstances that its interactions have previously
endowed with signiﬁcance. Individual self-insight develops
not absolutely but rather in time out of a series of contin-
gent, will-imbued interventions.
As Green notes, the decision to give priority to the indi-
vidual—as opposed to the social class, the in-group, the peo-
ple, the state apparatus, the culture, God, or gods—is an
epistemological one. Post-Enlightenment philosophy opened
up the radical thought that everyone should count for one
and none for more than one (a view shared, with diverging
ramiﬁcations, by Stirner and J. S. Mill, for example), but this
stance was (and has continued to be) challenged on all sides—
by corporations and would-be power brokers of every stamp.
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